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INTRODUCTION
With the ever-changing testimony of a single eyewitness and a non-
existent motive, at Petitioner George Souliotes's trial, the State built its
case around one piece of physical evidence - his shoes. The State
convinced the jury that the science simply could not lie - that it could tell
only one tale, the tale of Mr. Souliotes's guilt.
The newly discovered evidence presented to this Court regarding
that crucial piece of evidence now tells a much different tale. In the face of
this exonerating evidence, the State now argues that the shoes were not
important at all. Despite the State's back-pedaling, however, the
prosecutor's words at trial remain the same. The shoes indeed tell the tale -
and this time it is a clear story of Mr. Souliotes's innocence.
In addition to presenting a newly discovered evidence claim, Mr.
Souliotes brings the inter-related claims of ineffective assistance of counsel
and violation of his right to consular assistance under the Vienna
Convention. Unlike a typical claim of ineffective assistance, Mr. Souliotes
does not ask the Court to divine what might have been had he been
represented by competent counsel who presented witnesses in his defense.
Rather, the hung jury in Mr. Souliotes's first trial shows the Court what
would have been.
When defense counsel actually presented the jury with the witnesses
he promised, when he challenged the prosecution's arson theory with more
DOCSSFI:867880.3 l
than just cross-examination, when he presented live testimony concerning
his client's finances and family -we know the jury did not return with a
verdict of'_guilty. '' Had Mr. Souliotes been given the representation to
which he was entitled at his second trial, and had he been given access to
Greek-speaking assistance without delay, the outcome would have been
demonstrably different.
Mr. Souliotes deserved to have witnesses presented in his defense.
He deserved to have an advocate who spoke his language. The recent
technological advancements concerning the scientific evidence used to
convict Mr. Souliotes highlight the grave injustice Mr. Souliotes suffered at
his second trial. Accordingly, the Court must grant Mr. Souliotes's Second
Amended Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus.
ARGUMENT
I. RESPONDENT HAS FAILED TO REFUTE MR.
SOULIOTES'S NEWLY DISCOVERED EVIDENCE CLAIM
A. Respondent Misstates the Standard for a Newly
Discovered Evidence Claim
The parties agree that a habeas claim for newly discovered evidence
may be brought where the "evidence casts fundamental doubt on the
accuracy and reliability of the proceedings ..." Informal Response at 26,
quoting In re Clark (1993) 5 Cal. 4th 750, 766; People v. Gonzales (1990)
51 Cal. 3d 1179, 1246.
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Mr. Soulioteshaspresentednew evidenceto this Court concerning
the medium petroleum distillates ("MPDs") found at the scene of the fire
and subsequently on Mr. Souliotes's shoes. At trial, the prosecution argued
that the MPDs linked Mr. Souliotes to the crime scene. Newly discovered
evidence, however, conclusively demonstrates that the MPDs in the home
and the MPDs on the shoes could not have come from the same source.
Respondent argues that this MPD evidence does not meet the
standard for a newly discovered evidence claim because it does not
"contradict eyewitness evidence" or "undermine the evidence showing
petitioner's motive." Informal Response at 26-27. Respondent's cursory
consideration of the MPD evidence fails to acknowledge the importance the
prosecution placed upon the evidence at trial. Furthermore, Respondent's
interpretation of the standard ignores the court's explanation in In re Hall
that newly discovered evidence need not "specifically refute .... each bit of
prosecutorial evidence." h7 re Hall (1982) 30 Cal. 3d 408,423. Rather, the
evidence must "undermine the entire prosecution case and point unerringly
to innocence." In re Clark, 5 Cal. 4th at 766. Mr. Souliotes's evidence
does just that.
As explained in Mr. Souliotes's opening brief, the only physical
evidence the prosecution had at trial linking Mr. Souliotes to the crime
scene was the presence of MPD residue on his shoes. The newly
discovered evidence demonstrates conclusively that the chemical residue
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found on items from the rental home could not have come from the same
source as the chemical residue found on Mr. Souliotes's shoes. (Exh. B,
¶ 18.) The new evidence thus discredits the prosecution's evidence at trial
which appeared to place Mr. Souliotes in the house at the time of the fire.
Without this critical piece of scientific evidence, the prosecution's theory
placing Mr. Souliotes at the scene of the fire is wholly undermined.
B. Respondent Mischaracterizes the Significance of the MPD
Evidence at Trial
According to Respondent, the MPD shoe evidence "represents only
a small part of the prosecution's case, and was by no means the strongest or
most conclusive evidence pointing to petitioner's guilt." Informal
Response at 28. Respondent drastically underestimates the importance
placed on the evidence by the prosecution at trial. As Respondent points
out, there was other evidence presented at trial - evidence that had nothing
to do with MPDs or shoes. The State called an unreliable eyewitness with a
constantly changing story. Monica Sandoval, the State's only eyewitness,
initially described a vehicle vastly different from the Winnebago that she
eventually identified, which was owned by Mr. Souliotes. (RT 5938-48.)
Ms. Sandoval was also unable to make a positive identification at the line-
up on the afternoon following the fire, and admitted that she did not get a
good enough look at the perpetrator, but was suddenly able to identify Mr.
Souliotes six months later at the preliminary hearing after seeing Mr.
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Souliotes's photo in the paperseveral times. (RT 5887, 5890, 5952-53,
5995-98, 5960.) Ms. Sandoval facedcriminal chargesin January 1997that
were inexplicably dismissed. (RT 5864-65.)
The Statealso argueda financial motive theory that was full of
holes. While the State implied that Mr. Souliotesset fire to his own house
to collect insuranceproceeds,testimony from the first trial establishedthat
Mr. Souliotes was financially secureand that therewasvirtually no
monetary benefit to committing insurancefraud. (RT 3349-63.)
But, the one scientific piece of evidence that the State did have was
the chemical residue found at the crime scene and on Mr. Souliotes's shoes.
The MPDs tested by the DOJ were the one piece of evidence that
seemingly could not be questioned. Despite what lingering doubts the jury
may rightfully have had about Ms. Sandoval's dubious identifications or
the State's perplexing and unsubstantiated motive theory, one single image
remained burned into their collective minds: the image of George
Souliotes's shoes covered with the same flammable substance found at the
crime scene.
In its closing argument, the State emphasized the importance of the
shoes to the case: "The most conclusive scientific evidence, on his shoes
from wearing that morning, medium petroleum distillates. What set the
fire? Medium petroleum distillates." (RT 9049.) The State ended its
closing with what it believed to be its strongest piece of evidence, "l've
DOCSSF 1:867880.3 5
proven that it was an arson ... From that flows the rest. From that the
finger of guilt points to the defendant. Doesn't point to the one-armed man.
It points to George Souliotes because he's the one. The shoes tell the
tale." (RT 9050 (emphasis added).) While Respondent now
understandably seeks to retreat from the shoe evidence it relied on at trial, it
is simply false to claim that this evidence played anything other than a
central role in the prosecution of Mr. Souliotes.
C. Respondent's Argument that MPDs Were Presented as a
"Class of Substances, Not a Single Chemical" Is
Disingenuous
By referencing the trial testimony of criminalist Sara Yoshida,
Respondent argues that MPDs were presented at trial as "a class of
substances, not a single chemical." Informal Response at 30. Respondent
wholly ignores, however, how the MPD evidence was explained and argued
to the jury. It is clear from the State's opening statement and closing
argument that the jury was left with the distinct impression that the MPDs
found in the rental home were the exact same substance found on Mr.
Souliotes's shoes.
During its opening statement, the State explained to the jury,
[The investigators] go inside the house. They find a pair of
shoes that the defendant had been wearing earlier in the day
and it hits with the hydrocarbon detector as well. So they
take those shoes and they take them to D.O.J.D.O.J. says it
has a medium petroleum distillate on it. The same thing that
was used to start the fire.
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(9 RT 5687-88 (emphasis added).) Again in the closing, the State
emphasized the rarity of MPDs and implied to the jury that where they are
found, they must come from the same source. The State noted,
There was something else that was kind of unique, those
medium petroleum distillates. We heard a lot about anything
and everything could be a medium petroleum distillate. But
again we have the theoretical possibilities, this academic kind
of world and we have real life. Those firefighters go out to
scenes all the time. They can tell the difference ... And in
their experience these medium petroleum distillates were
unusual, very unusual ..."
(RT 9033.) Furthermore, the State explicitly discounted the idea that
MPDs could come from a variety of sources.
Well, it could be shoe polish. Well, no, it can't be.
Remember [DOJ expert] told us about that. You take it out of
the can, just like Bruce Elliot said, when you open up the can
maybe there's some ammonia in there right away, but
eventually, poof, it's gone. The very nature of that stuffis for
it to evaporate. [The DOJ expert] said she put shoe polish on
the shoe and it tests for medium petroleum distillate. She
leaves it out for a couple of days, tests it the same way,
heating it, this big stuff about well, it could be the soles
because you're melting it, you're burning it. No. We know
the same thing in this case because later on when she retested
the shoe that stuff was gone. It had evaporated ... It just so
happened to be the shoes the defendant was wearing early in
the day and it just so happens to be the same type of stuff
that's found over at the house.
(RT 9033-34.)
At trial, the State argued strenuously to the jury that the MPDs found
at the fire scene were the exact same chemical found on Mr. Souliotes's
shoes. With only shaky eyewitness testimony and a questionable motive
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theory at its disposal, the State placed an understandable emphasis on this
scientific evidence, arguing that the shoes told the entire story - that they
were, without question, the most important piece of evidence available to
the State. Now, with that piece of evidence thoroughly debunked, Mr.
Souliotes requests that the Court grant relief on the newly discovered
evidence claim.
II. RESPONDENT HAS FAILED TO REFUTE MR.
SOULIOTES'S CLAIM FOR INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE
OF COUNSEL
A. Mr. Souliotes's Claim Is Timely
Respondent argues that Mr. Souliotes's ineffective assistance of
counsel claim is untimely because over a year passed between the issuance
of remittitur and the filing of Mr. Souliotes's initial habeas petition in the
Superior Court. Informal Response at 24-26. I The standard for timeliness
in non-capital habeas cases does not depend on a specified number of days,
but rathei" on whether the petition was filed as promptly as circumstances
allow. See In re Stankewitz (1985) 40 Cal. 3d 391. As explained in Mr.
Souliotes's opening brief, Mr. Souliotes has been diligent in pursuit and
presentation of his claim, and no substantial delay has occurred.
Respondent notes in its Informal Response that the date of the Superior
Court filing is unclear because Mr. Souliotes did not attach the petition as
an exhibit. For clarification, Mr. Souliotes attaches the filed and endorsed
copy showing the filing date of December 10, 2003 as Exhibit A to the
accompanying Declaration of Randall S. Luskey in Support of Reply to
Respondent's Informal Response, filed herewith.
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Mr. Souliotes retained his present counsel, The Northern California
Innocence Project and Orrick, Herrington & Sutcliffe LLP, in the fall of
2002. (Exh. T. 2) Prior to that time, Mr. Souliotes was unable to evaluate
his own claims adequately given his limited English and education. Such
limitations have been recognized as good cause for delay. See In re
Saunders (1970) 2 Cal. 3d 1033, 1040; In re Spears (1984) 157 Cal. App.
3d 1203, 1208.
Once Mr. Souliotes obtained counsel, they faced the overwhelming
and time-consuming task of thoroughly reviewing the clerk's and reporter's
transcripts from Mr. Souliotes's two trials. Mr. Souliotes's attorneys, on a
pro bono basis, then conducted an in-depth investigation which included
tracking down and obtaining declarations from each of the ten witnesses
who testified on Mr. Souliotes's behalf at his first trial. California courts
generally commend these sorts of pro bono engagements. See, e.g.,
Mowrer v. Superior Court (1984) 155 Cal. App. 3d 262, 266 ("We admire
and encourage these noble efforts and hope they increase."). If we wish to
encourage these efforts in the future, the delay associated with the transition
to new counsel must be excused. Given the volume of material and
2 All references to exhibits are to the Declaration of Sasha Abrams in
Support of Motion for Leave to File Second Amended Petition for Writ of
Habeas Corpus unless otherwise noted.
DOCSSFI:867880.3 9
witnesses involved, the time taken to file Mr. Souliotes's habeas petition is
justified.
B. Respondent Cannot Refute Mr. Souliotes's Prima Facie
Case for Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
The parties agree that a claim for ineffective assistance of counsel
must demonstrate that: (1) the attorney's performance was so deficient that
it fell below an objective standard of reasonableness; and (2) but for the
deficient performance of counsel, petitioner would have had a more
favorable outcome. Strickland v. Washington (1984) 466 U.S. 668, 687-88,
693; People v. Benavides (2005) 35 Cal. 4th 69, 92. Respondent is correct
that trial counsel is afforded wide latitude to make strategic decisions, and
that no one could function within a legal system that allowed for trial by
hindsight or Monday morning quarterbacking. Mere words from trial
counsel asserting that a reasoned decision occurred, however, are not
sufficient to defeat an ineffective assistance of counsel claim. A decision
that is wholly below the level of reasonable representation cannot be
excused simply because an attorney decides to call it a strategy. Both the
United States and California Constitutions protect criminal defendants from
such callous inadequacy. See, e.g., Siripongs v. Calderon (9th Cir. 1994)
35 F.3d 1308 (mere assertion by the State that its decision not to mount a
defense was "tactical" was insufficient where the "record ... does not
contain any evidence from which it can be inferred that trial counsel's
DOCSSF1:867880 3 1 0
decision ... was the result of an informed, tactical decision") (emphasis
added).
1. Respondent Fails Adequately to Address the Impact
Defense Counsel's Promises Regarding Dr. Myronuk Had
• on the Case
In his opening brief, Mr. Souliotes explained the detailed expert
testimony from Dr. Myronuk which was promised to the jury by defense
counsel. Opening Brief at 56-58. Respondent discounts these promises,
explaining that "the jury learned about the expert's theory regarding the
cause of the fire and learned the substance of his testimony during the
second trial." Informal Response at 32. It is no secret, however, that the
cross-examination of a prosecution expert does not carry the same weight
or have the same impact as presenting one's own experts to answer
hypotheticals and to explain various theories. The substance of Dr.
Myronuk's theory was not presented with specificity, substantiation or
persuasiveness through cross-examination.
The differences between the testimony of the expert witnesses on
each side is stark. In the second trial, Dr. Myronuk's testimony would have
countered the prosecution's arson experts on a number of key points. In
response to the prosecution's arson theory that the perpetrator entered the
home by prying open the sliding glass door fi'om the back patio, Dr.
Myronuk would have testified, as he did in the first trial, that there was no
evidence of pry marks and that the door was double-paned and weighed
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110 pounds such that someone attempting to pry it out of the frame would
certainly have left a mark. (RST 3520.) Second, Dr. Myronuk would have
countered the prosecution's theory that the fire was a liquid pour fire by
showing how the patterns on the floors were instead caused by superheated
liquid tar from the roof. (RST 3485.) Third, ira response to the contention
that the fire traveled from the garage into the kitchen, thereby
demonstrating that arson could have started through the garage door, in the
first trial Dr. Myronuk testified with extensive supporting documentation
that the fire traveled exactly the opposite direction, from the kitchen to the
garage. Finally, Dr. Myronuk would have bolstered the argument that a gas
leak caused the fire with testimony about the abnormally intense burning in
the vicinity of the stove, the potentially faulty brass flex hose connecting
the gas line to the stove, and the various possible sources of ignition in the
kitchen. (RST 3587.) His testimony would have stood in direct contrast to
the prosecution's experts, who admitted that they had only ruled out the gas
leak due to other evidence of arson. (RT 8641, 8791-92.)
The State's contention that "defense counsel was able to present [Dr.
Myronuk's] theory to the jury" through cross-examination is undermined
by the fact that this supposedly comprehensive presentation occupies a
scant three pages of the trial transcript. (RT 8723-25.) All the jury learned
through defense counsel's cross-examination of the State's experts is that
another view existed. The State's experts, however, were given the
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opportunity to look thejury in the eyesand discredit this view. Because
defense counsel never called Dr. Myronuk to the stand, the jury never heard
his theories first hand. Dr. Myronuk's testimony in the first trial takes up
361 pages of the transcript, and includes extensive testimony integrating
various pieces of evidence with his theory. (RST 3468-3590, 3706-3945.)
Defense counsel's cursory three-page summary of Dr. Myronuk's theory
during the second trial - without any background, substantiation, or
explanation upon which the theory is premised - is not a replacement for
Dr. Myronuk's actual testimony. As the judge at the first trial instructed
the jury, "[i]n resolving any conflict that may exist in the testimony of an
expert witness, you should weigh the opinion of one expert against that of
another. In doing this, you should consider the relative qualification and
believability of the expert witness, as well as the reasons for each opinion
and the facts and other matters upon which it is based." (RST 4065.) At
the second trial, the jury never heard this instruction because there was
simply no defense expert ever presented to contradict the State's experts'
testimony.
The amount of time spent by the prosecution discrediting the
defense's phantom expert based on his failure to appear highlights the error
committed bydefense counsel in failing to call Dr. Myronuk as a live
witness. The prosecution derisively referred to Dr. Myronuk repeatedly as
"Waldo" (RT 9015-16), referencing the popular children's character
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"Where's Waldo" who is notoriously difficult to locate. The prosecution
also referred to Dr. Myronuk as "mythical Dr. Fire." (RT 9017.) And if
the jury had any occasion to believe the mythical Dr. Myronuk's theories as
presented through cross-examination, they surely did not after the State
argued,
You're supposed to judge the believability of the expert
witness - how believable is Dr. Myronuk when you haven't
seen him? ... Dr. Myronuk did not come to court and did not
subject himself to cross-examination ... Is that very
believable? Somebody that won't even come and answer
questions. So under those instructions the Judge gave you,
guess what. You can throw out everything that he says.
(RT 9020.) The State was able to effectively "throw out" Dr. Myronuk as
the witness who didn't even show up, when, in fact, Dr. Myronuk was
willing to testify, expecting to testify, and troubled when he wasn't asked to
testify. (E.'xh. E.)
2. Respondent's Characterization of Defense Counsel's
Decision Regarding Dr. Myronuk as Strategic Is
Unreasonable
Respondent attempts to side-step defense counsel's failure to call Dr.
Myronuk by suggesting that it was the result of a tactical decision.
Informal Response at 33. Respondent claims that Dr. Myronuk, after all,
was a "cheerleader" and defense counsel had observed him in their first
trial "and they were in the best position to judge whether the witness was
more helpful or harmful to their client's case." ld. While these things may
be true, it is clear from defense counsel's opening statement in the second
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trial that he had made the tactical decision to use Dr. Myronuk in Mr.
Souliotes's defense. There is no other explanation for the repeated
references to Dr. Myronuk's testimony and the promises made to the jury
that they would in fact hear a theory of the case from the defense that did
not include arson. By promising a crucial expert who never materialized,
defense counsel unquestionably prejudiced the outcome of Mr. Souliotes's
trial.
3. Respondent's Piece-Meal Attempt to Address Defense
Counsel's Failure to Call Other Witnesses Ignores the
Cumulative Effect of Such Error
In addition to Dr. Myronuk, defense counsel failed to call nine other
available defense witnesses to testify on Mr. Souliotes's behalf during the
second trial. Respondent addresses each of these witnesses one at a time in
its Informal Response, arguing a variety of reasons as to why each
individual was not crucial to Mr. Souliotes's defense. Respondent's
strategy, however, ignores the cumulative effect that failing to call any
witnesses had on the outcome of Mr. Souliotes's trial. Cumulatively, the
actions of defense counsel indicate that they abandoned any viable defense
of Mr. Souliotes.
As the court held in Corona,
... when trial counsel fails to acquire facts necessary to a
crucial defense or tOfollow the facts already in his possession
or to develop facts to which his attention is called ... his
failure to raise a defense or defenses which could have been
DOCSSFl:867880.3 15
establishedby making the aforestatedrequisite efforts cannot
be justified by reference to trial strategy or tactics.
People v. Corona (1978) 80 Cal. App. 3d 684, 706 (emphasis added).
Indeed, the promise to call a witness and then the failure to do so indicates
the opposite of a "rational, tactical" strategy, for there is no conceivable
explanation of how such behavior could ultimately help Mr. Souliotes.
Such a decision only served to "shock" and "anger" certain jurors. (Exh. O
at 9.) 3
Moreover, defense counsel's failure to call any defense witness from
the first trial because of a belief that the prosecution had failed to prove its
case indicates an unreasonable defense strategy. The prosecution presented
a substantially similar case in the second trial. Defense counsel has no
reasonable explanation for how a failure to call any witnesses would lead to
a similar or better result for Mr. Souliotes.
3 Respondent argues that the juror interviews contained in Exhibit O, as
well as the polygraph tests, are inadmissible evidence. This argument is
premature. In petitioning the Court for an Order to Show Cause, Mr.
Souliotes simply must plead adequate facts that allow the Court to make a
preliminary deternfination that Mr. Souliotes is entitled to relief. See
California Rules of Court Rule 4.55 l(c)(1) (2006) ("the court takes
petitioner's factual allegations as true and makes a preliminary assessment
regarding whether the petitioner would be entitled to relief if his ... factual
allegations were proved"); People v. Duval (1995) 9 Cal. 4th 464, 474
(petitioner has the "burden initially to plead sufficient grounds for relief,
and then later toprove them"); People v. Romero (1994) 8 Cal. 4th 728,
737-38. An evidentiary hearing, rather than the pleading stage, is the
proper forum to determine the admissibility of evidence.
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Taken as a whole, defense counsels' actions indicate that they had
no strategy at all. The Alcala court considered counsel's ineffective
assistance along with other errors which took place at the trial, such as the
improper exclusion of certain witnesses by the court, holding that "the
cumulative effect of these errors 'operated to deprive Alcala of a
fundamentally fair trial.' ... even if no single error were [sufficiently]
prejudicial, 'their cumulative effect may nevertheless be so prejudicial as to
require reversal.'" Alcala v. Woodford (9th Cir. 2003) 334 F.3d 862, 893,
citing Killian v. Poole (9th Cir. 2002) 282 F.3d 1204, 1211. The court
found that the "cumulative impact of these errors goes to the heart of the
prosecution's theory of the case and undermines every important element of
proof offered by the prosecution against Alcala." Id. Similarly, the
cumulative effect of defense counsel's failure to call a single defense
witness from the first trial served to deprive Mr. Souliotes of a defense in
this matter. The testimony that defense counsel failed to present would
have attacked every aspect of the prosecution's theory of the case. The
relative length of the jury deliberations at the two trials is illustrative of the
impact defense counsel's failure to call witnesses had on the jury. At the
first trial, the jury deliberated for three days before their deadlock vote was
accepted. At the second trial, the jury deliberated for less than five and a
half hours before returning their guilty verdict. (RT 9257, 9263.)
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Respondentclaims that Mr. Soulioteswasnot prejudicedby defense
counsel's failure to call any witnessesto show theabsenceof a financial
motive becausenone of thesewitnesses"directly contradict[ed]" the State's
motive theory presentedat the secondtrial. Informal Responseat 35. Mr.
Souliotes disagrees. The StatepresentedMr. Marks' testimony that Mr.
Soulioteswas "in dire financial straits." Informal Responseat 35, citing at
7018-20. Severalwitnesses- including ShazadContractor,Gary Nelson,
Jill LeBlanc and Demetre Souliotes- testified during the first trial that, as
of January 1997,Mr. Soulioteswas financially secure. Memorandum of
Points and Authorities in Support of SecondAmendedPetition for Habeas
Corpus ("P&A") at 69-72. All were available to testify at the second trial
(Exhs. F, J, M, and N) and defense counsel's decision not to present any
testimony to refute financial motive is inexplicable.
The failure of defense counsel to present any witnesses from the first
trial undermined Mr. Souliotes's defense and resulted in an improper jury
verdict. For these reasons, Mr. Souliotes asks for relief on his second
habeas claim for ineffective assistance of counsel.
III. RESPONDENT HAS FAILED TO REFUTE MR.
SOULIOTES'S VIENNA CONVENTION CLAIM
A. Mr. Souliotes's Claim Is Timely
Though Respondent argues that Mr. Souliotes's Vienna Convention
claim is untimely (Informal Response at 45), it was filed without substantial
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delay. Delay is measured from the time Mr. Souliotes knew, or reasonably
should have known, of"the information offered in support of the claim and
the legal basis for the claim." Bennett v. Muller (9th Cir. 2003) 322 F.3d
573,581, citing In re Robbins (1998) 18 Cal. 4th 770, 787 (emphasis
added). While Respondent is correct that Mr. Souliotes knew that he was
not a citizen of the United States at the time of his trial, he did not know of
the legal basis for his Vienna Convention claim until the ICJ's Avena
decision and the U.S. Supreme Court's subsequent grant of certiorari in
Medellin. Medellin v. Dretke (2004) 125 S.Ct. 686; Avena (Mex. v. U.S.)
2003 I.C.J. 128 (Jan 9).
Respondent asserts that the passage of over four years between Mr.
Souliotes's sentencing and the filing of his Vienna Convention claim makes
his argument per se untimely. Informal Response at 45. California courts,
however, do not impose a definite standard as to a minimum amount of
time that constitutes a substantial delay. Bennett, 322 F.3d at 579-80. Mr.
Souliotes's delay in filing his Vienna Convention claim should be excused
because it was reasonable and explainable. In re Harris (1993) 5 Cal. 4th
813,828 ("a petitioner seeking relief on habeas corpus need only file a
petition without substantial delay, or, if delayed, adequately explain the
delay"). Mr. Souliotes was diligent in the presentation of his claim once he
realized its legal basis and the transition to new habeas counsel explains his
delay in filing.
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Respondent's timeliness position represents something of a Catch-
22. When law enforcement officers or other State authorities disregard
their obligation to notify a detained t'oreign national of his right to consular
assistance "without delay," it is counter-intuitive to punish the foreign
national for failing to assert that right immediately.
B. Mr. Souliotes's Vienna Convention Claim Is Not
Procedurally Defaulted
Respondent cites Breard and argues that Mr. Souliotes's Vienna
Convention claim is procedurally defaulted because it was not raised at trial
or in his appeal. See Breard v. Greene (1998) 523 U.S. 371,375. The
ICJ's decisions in both LaGrand and Avena, however, postdate and
contradict Breard, in holding that "procedural default rules cannot bar
review of the petitioner's claim." Avena, ¶¶ 113-14; LaGrand (F.R.G.v.
U.S.) 2001 I.C.J. 104 (Jun. 27). Recognizing the tension between the ICJ's
Avena mandate and the Breard opinion, the U.S. Supreme Court has
granted certiorari to resolve this impasse and will hear oral arguments in
Bustillo v. Johnson (Nov. 7, 2005), 2005 U.S. LEXIS 8220, on March 29,
2006. At the very least, Mr. Souliotes raises this claim in his current
petition as a means of protecting it for further review should the Supreme
Court find such a claim viable and appropriate.
Additionally, Mr. Souliotes should be excused for not asserting his
Vienna Convention rights during the trial or the direct appeal. Mr.
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Souliotes spokealmost no English upon arriving in this country from
Greeceand hecontinued to strugglewith languageat the time of his trials
and direct appeal. Mr. Souliotes's extremely limited understandingof the
legal system combined with defense counsel's ineffective representation
during his trials, explains why Mr. Souliotes was unaware of his Article 36
rights. Courts have previously found that such educational and access
difficulties were good cause for delay. See, e.g., In re Saunders (1970) 2
Cal. 3d 1033, 1040. Habeas corpus represents the first forum in which Mr.
Souliotes knew of the availability of a claim under the Vienna Convention.
Procedurally barring him from raising such a claim is unjust.
Article 36 of the Vienna Convention does create an individually
enforceable right to consular assistance. See Avena, ¶¶ 121-22, ! 53(9)
(254A, 274A). Respondent correctly points out that some federal courts
have ignored the Avena decision and found that the Vienna Convention
does not create enforceable rights. Informal Response at 44. However, the
Supreme Court has historically recognized that treaties create individually
enforceable rights. See, e.g., Owings v. Norwood's Lessee (1809) 9 U.S.
(5 Cranch) 344, 348 (Marshall, C.J.) ("Each treaty stipulates something
respecting the citizens of the two nations, and gives them rights. Whenever
a right grows out of, or is protected by, a treaty, it is sanctioned against all
the laws and judicial decisions of the states; and whoever may have this
right, it is to beprotected."). The Supreme Court looks to resolve this
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conflict betweenthe federal courtsand the ICJ in Bustillo in the coming
months.
C. Mr. Souliotes's Consular Notification Claim Is Cognizable
in This Court
Respondent argues that Mr. Souliotes does not state any recognized
basis for relief under the Vienna Convention because he did not inform the
police he was a Greek citizen. Informal Response at 45. In fact, Mr.
Souliotes did personally inform Detective Butler that he was a Greek
citizen. (Exh. V, ¶ 7.) Additionally, Mr. Souliotes showed his wallet,
containing his green card, to an investigating officer (Exh. W, pg. 7), and
told the detectives that he was originally from Greece. (Exh. V, ¶ 5; Exh.
X, pg. 3.) The detectives even discussed Mr. Souliotes's upbringing and
childhood in Greece. (Exh. X, pg. 3.) The police had reason to know that
Mr. Souliotes was not a United States citizen, and was thus subject to the
protections of the Vienna Convention.
Respondent also alleges that Mr. S0uliotes should have known to
contact the Greek consulate on his own. Informal Response at 45-46. This
claim is without merit. It is true that Mr. Souliotes was familiar with the
existence of the Greek Consulate. However, "knowledge of passport
renewal procedures is entirely distinct from knowledge of international
treaties. Respondent's argument also confuses the obligations imposed by
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the Vienna Convention. It was the responsibility of the authorities to notify
Mr. Souliotes of his rights underArticle 36, not the other way around.
D. Respondent Misstates the Standard for Prejudice Under
Article 36 of the Vienna Convention
While Respondent repeatedly asserts that Mr. Souliotes suffered no
actual harm, Respondent ignores Mr. Souliotes's argument that he need not
make such a showing to establish prejudice under Article 36. Mr. Souliotes
need only demonstrate that (1) he did not know he had a right to consular
assistance; (2) he would have availed himself of that right had he known of
it; and (3) it was likely that the consulate would have provided assistance.
See, e.g., U.S. v. Rangel-Gonzales (9th Cir. 1980) 617 F.2d 529; Torres v.
Oklahoma (Okl. Cr. Sept. 6, 2005) 2005 OK CR17, at *4. Mr. Souliotes
has met that burden. See P&A at 94.
Respondent mischaracterizes Mr. Souliotes's prejudice claim. Mr.
Souliotes is not claiming, as Respondent suggests, that California law
entitles him to a Greek-speaking attorney. Instead, Mr. Souliotes contends
that contact with the Greek consulate would have provided him with the
language assistance and connections necessary to comprehend fully the
gravity of the charges against him. ld. Mr. Souliotes was awakened at his
house on January 15, 1997 and thrust into a legal system with rules and
procedures entirely foreign to him. Mr. Souliotes never hired an attorney at
any time leading up to his arraignment. Immediate consular access would
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have put Mr. Souliotes in abetterposition to obtain legal and investigative
assistance. For these reasons, Mr. Souliotes asks for relief on his third
claim for denial of consular assistance.
CONCLUSION
The evidence which once provided the only credible link between
Mr. Souliotes and the crime for which he is charged has been conclusively
discredited. Winding his way through the labyrinth of an already
convoluted foreign legal system, Mr. Souliotes was denied his
constitutional right to competent counsel and his Vienna Convention right
to consular access. The newly discovered MPD evidence establishes that
Mr. Souliotes has indeed been trapped in a maze he should never have
entered. Had he been provided the representation and guidance he
deserved, such a miscarriage of justice would never have occurred.
For the foregoing reasons, and the reasons stated in Mr. Souliotes's
opening brief, Mr. Souliotes respectfully requests that the Court grant his
Second Amended Petition for Habeas Corpus.
///
///
///
///
///
///
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